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WATER POLLUTION: ROLE OF THE COURTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Within the past several years, there has been a startling awakening
to environmental problems. It may be premature to speculate on the
scope and penetration of this new awareness, but mass participation in
Earth Day, April 17, 1970, and increased coverage of environmental
affairs by the communications media illustrate broad public concern.'
This past year has seen much activity-expansion of basic research,
investment in pollution abatement devices, state and federal legislation,
and the establishment of a major federal agency, the Environmental
Protection Agency.2 While the goals reached are relatively minor in
proportion to the total situation, these are important first steps. A
year and a half ago the cry was for attention, the need now is for de-
tailed and specific programs and careful evaluation of methods and
procedures for resolving pollution problems.
Among the institutions most pressured by the advent of environ-
mentalism are the courts. There has been a great upsurge in litiga-
tion.3 Yet, it is not so much the sheer volume of cases which is
critical, rather the role within the scheme of environmental reform
which courts are urged to take. This paper analyzes the scope of
court action with respect to a particular problem-inland water pollu-
tion-and evaluates the utility of the courts as a primary tool in re-
medial action.
Environmental litigation can be conveniently divided into three
areas: 1) private lawsuits seeking damages or equitable relief against
polluting sources; 2) the adjudication of criminal and civil charges
against alleged violators of pollution control statutes; and 3) citizen
suits challenging the activities of public officials in preserving or ad-
ministering public resources.4 Unfortunately, the assumption persists
1. See generally, THE E TH TOOL Krr: A FIELD MANUAL FOR CmIzEN AcTvsIVs
(S. Love ed. 1971).
2. The Environmental Protection Agency was established by Reorganization Plan
No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15623 (1970).
3. Krier, The Pollution Problem and Legal Institutions: A Conceptual Overview,
18 U.C.LA. L. REv. 429, 448 (1970).
4. Id. at 429. Professor Krier also lists as a role of the courts, "the policing of
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that the courts are equally effective in all three areas. The consequence
of this line of thinking has been to find a solution to pollution
problems in the simple motto, "sue the bastards."5  A more detailed
analysis demonstrates that the effectiveness of the courts varies with
respect to each type of suit.6
I. ACTIONS BY PRIVATE PARTIES AGAINST POLLUTERS
The most common forms of private litigation against water pollut-
ers are the resurrected common law torts of riparian rights, nuisance,
and trespass. Riparian rights proceeds from the doctrine that each
proprietor of land abutting a watercourse has a co-equal right to use
water in that watercourse. 7  An early rule held that each riparian had
the right to water in a substantially natural condition,8 but the more
modem and majority view is that each riparian can make reasonable
use of the water even if this alters its quantity or quality.0 The court,
in deciding whether a use is reasonable, considers the nature of the
impurities released in the water flow, the size and velocity of the
stream, the extent of the injury, and the economic costs of pollution
abatement to industry and municipalities.' 0 Damages or injunctive
legislative programs under the constitutional requirements of due process and equal pro-
tection." Since, however, constitutional problems may arise in any of the three cate-
gories, it seems to us best to include this area with the first three.
5. Address by V. Yannacone, delivered on "Earth Day" at Michigan State Uni-
versity, April 22, 1970.
6. Environmental litigation should also be distinguished from litigation that only
affects the parties to the action. Environmental litigation is concerned with decisions
by courts that will have a significant impact on the environment. This type of litigation
is often, though not necessarily, initiated by an ideological or non-Hohfeldian plain-
tiff. This type of plaintiff is concerned with the use of the courts as an institutional
tool in solving problems of environmental pollution rather than with the courts' more
traditional task as arbiter of duties and rights. See generally, Jaffe, The Citizen as
Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. oF
PENN. L. REV. 1033 (1968); Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the
Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70 CoLum. L. REv. 612 (1970).
7. Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (no. 14,312) (C.C.R.I. 1827). A similar
doctrine exists for owners of land abutting still waters such as lakes. See, e.g., Hum-
phreys-Mexia Co. v. Arseneaux, 116 Tex. 603, 297 S.W. 225 (1927).
8. International Show Co. v. Heatwole, 126 W. Va. 888, 30 S.E.2d 537 (1944).
See also City of Canton v. Schock, 66 Ohio St. 19, 63 N.E. 600 (1902).
9. Merrifield v. City of Worcester, 110 Mass. 216 (1872); Borough of West-
ville v. Whitney Home Builders, Inc., 40 N.J. Super. 62, 122 A.2d 233 (Super. Ct
1956). See also W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 599-601 (4th ed. 1971).
10. Reese v. City of Johnstown, 45 Misc. 432, 92 N.Y.S. 728 (Sup. Ct. 1904),
quoting Townsend v. Bell, 167 N.Y. 462, 60 N.E. 757 (1901).
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relief may be awarded when the court finds defendant's pollution an
unreasonable use.
Actions in trespass have also been suggested as a device for en-
vironmental litigation, but their usefulness is limited by the rule that
a trespassory invasion must be a physical entry by a person or object."
Although the plaintiff need not show, as with riparian rights, a substan-
tial or unreasonable injury, it is very difficult to show that water pol-
lution has actually invaded one's land.'2 Moreover, as in the case of
riparian rights actions, it is often difficult to establish that one single
source along a polluted waterway is the individual "trespassor".
To a certain extent, a nuisance action alleviates the difficulties of
bringing an action under the riparian rights or trespass theories. It
does not require a showing of physical trespass, nor does it require
the plaintiff to be a contiguous landowner.'3 Generally, a nuisance
is an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of land. 4 It is divided
into "private nuisance" and "public nuisance", with some hybrids
combining elements of both. Private nuisance is an interference with
private enjoyment of land, and public nuisance is behavior that im-
pairs the welfare and comfort of the general community. 15 Some be-
havior can be classified as both public and private. For example,
if pollution of a river causes fish to die, there may be a private nui-
sance where the river flows through private property, and a public
nuisance in areas where there is an interference with the public's right
to fish.
11. Anderson v. Reynolds Metal Co., 125 F. Supp. 481 (W.D. Wash. 1954).
12. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 158 (1934).
13. Mandell v. Pivnick, 20 Conn. Supp. 99, 125 A.2d 175 (Super. Ct. 1956);
Miller v. Coleman, 213 Ga. 125, 97 S.E.2d 313 (1957). See also W. PROSSER, LAw OF
TORTS 572 (4th ed. 1971).
14. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 571 (4th ed. 1971). While the law of nuisance
can be described generally, it has many pitfalls and has often been described as an
"unbelievable morass". Moreover, the rubric of nuisance is often stretched by the
courts to cover anything from a cockroach in a piece of cherry pie to a bawdy house.
See, e.g., Carroll v. New York Pie Baking Co., 215 App. Div. 240, 213 N.Y.S. 553
(1926); Black v. Circuit Court of Eighth Judicial Dist., 78 S.D. 302, 101 N.W.2d 520
(1960).
15. City of Selma v. Jones, 202 Ala. 82, 79 So. 476 (1918). See also W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 572 (4th ed. 1971). Certain extremely hazardous or offensive
activities may be designated as nuisances per se. Ultimately, however, the courts must
still make reasonable use determinations for these activities just as for other nui-
sances.
Vol. 1972:291] 293
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Some fairly refined conceptual distinctions have been drawn to sep-
arate these two torts,1" but the major practical difference is that a pub-
lic nuisance action may traditionally be brought only by a public
official.17 Since water pollution -usually involves wide proliferation of
the pollutant throughout a water course or littoral body of water, it
has ordinarily been classified as a public nuisance. While courts have
on occasion allowed private nuisance actions to abate a public nui-
sance,1 8 the plaintiff has been required to show some special injury,
different in kind, not merely in degree, from that suffered by the
general public.19 Courts have been hesitant to recognize such special
injuries.' 0
The common law actions of trespass, riparian rights, and nuisance
were originally designed to settle disputes and establish relationships
between private individuals.2 They are not easily adapted for use as
wide-scale anti-pollution tools. The average citizen, a city dweller,
seeking to abate pollution through court action encounters two signifi-
cant difficulties. First, he probably lacks standing to sue. Unless he
has an interest in land on or near a watercourse, he has no basis to
maintain a riparian rights or trespass action, and, because of the pub-
lic nature of water pollution, he is foreclosed from bringing a private
action in nuisance. Second, even if a plaintiff has the proper standing
to bring a common law suit, he encounters the "balancing of equities
16. For example, the courts may try to draw lines concerning the number of liti-
gants involved in bringing the action. Apparently, the "public" may consist of six
people in South Dakota. Watson v. Great Lakes Pipeline Co., 182 N.W.2d 314 (S.D.
1970); 16 S.D.L. Rv. 510 (1971).
17. Attorney General v. City of Grand Rapids, 175 Mich. 503, 141 N.W. 890
(1913); Gibbons v. Hoffman, 203 Misc. 26, 115 N.Y.S.2d 632 (Sup. Ct. 1952). See
also W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 583 (4th ed. 1971).
18. Gibbons v. Hoffman, 203 Misc. 26, 115 N.Y.S.2d 632 (Sup. Ct. 1952); Kuehn
v. City of Milwaukee, 83 Wis. 583, 53 N.W. 912 (1892).
19. Some jurisdictions allow the special damages even if there is only a difference
in degree. Watson v. Great Lakes Pipeline Co., 182 N.W.2d 314 (S.D. 1970); 16
S.D. L. RFv. 510 (1971).
20. See, e.g., Kuehn v. City of Milwaukee, 83 Wise. 583, 53 N.W. 912 (1892),
where a professional fisherman on Lake Michigan brought an action against city offi-
cials to stop pollution of the Lake. He sought to enjoin them from further garbage
dumping, contending that the destruction of fish and rotting of his nets were sufficient
special damage for him to bring an action of abatement against the public nuisance.
The court, however, held that since any member of the public could fish in public
waters, there were no exclusive damages which would allow a private suit.
21. Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water Quality, 52 IowA
L. REv. 186, 197 (1966).
[Vol. 1972:291
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doctrine."22  Under this doctrine courts balance the plaintiff's injury
against the cost of abatement. Courts consider such things as loss of
jobs, taxes, and revenue to the community. 23 Thus, even though a
plaintiff suffers severe injury, courts are reluctant to award large money
damages or injunctive relief if the costs of abating the pollutants are
high.24
Environmental litigants have attempted to overcome the problems
of standing to sue and the balancing of equities doctrine inherent in
the old forms of action. 25  Devices such as anti-trust suits, 26 stock-
holders derivative suits27 and class actions28 have been employed to
alleviate standing difficulties and to consolidate the claims of many in-
dividuals.-9 In a more direct approach, legislation to facilitate private
litigations against polluters has also been suggested. To date, one
22. Apparently the doctrine is of ancient vintage. An old case said in regard to
candle-making in a town: "Le utility del chose excusera le noisomeness del stink".
W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 581-82 (4th ed. 1971). See generally, Roberts, The Right
to a Decent Environment, E=MC2: Environment Equals Man Times Court Redoubling
Their Efforts, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 674 (1970).
23. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 30 App. Div. 2d 480, 294 N.Y.S.2d 452
(1968); Soukoup v. Republic Steel Corp., 78 Ohio App. 87, 66 N.E.2d 334 (1946).
24. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 30 App. Div. 2d 480, 294 N.Y.S.2d 452
(1968).
25. The balancing of equities doctrine is almost always used in riparian rights and
nuisance actions. It may even have been used rarely in trespass actions. See, e.g.,
Lampert v. Reynolds Metal Co., 372 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1967).
26. To date, only one such anti-trust class action has been brought against a
polluter, but it has been held that a major obstacle to environmental class actions under
the anti-trust laws, the requirement of a commercial relationship between the litigants,
is not necessary. In re MultiDistrict Private Civil Treble Damage Antitrust Litigation
Involving Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equipment, 1970 Trade Cas. 89.251
(C.D. Cal.). See also Comment, Private Antitrust Actions Against Air Polluters-
Commercial Relationship Between Litigants Not Necessary to Maintain an Ac-
tion for Violation of Section 1 of Sherman Act, 24 VAND. L. Rv. 126 (1971). An-
ti-trust actions are particularly attractive because of the treble-damages provisions for
those injured. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
27. Comment, Shareholder's Derivative Suit-A Solution to the Pollution Problem?,
5 VAL. U.L. Rv. 149 (1970).
28. In a class action, suit may be brought by members of a class as representa-
tives of the entire class, so long as these representatives meet certain standards. FED.
R. Civ. P. 23. This device can get out of hand, however. In Diamond v. General
Motors Corp., No. 947429 (Super. Ct. Cal., Aug. 20, 1969), appeal docketed
Civ. No. 36600, 2d Dist. Ct. App., Oct. 15, 1969, a class action was filed on behalf
of all the people in Los Angeles County against 291 companies polluting the air.
The court dismissed the action. For an extended argument favouring class actions,
see Lamm, Dabison, Environmental Class Actions Seeking Damages, 16 RocKY
MT. M.L. INsT. 59 (1971).
29. Storley v. Armour & Co., 107 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1939).
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state, Michigan, has enacted such legislation. The Michigan Environ-
mental Protection Act of 197030 creates a right of action in any
person, corporation, governmental agency, or other legal entity against
another legal entity "for the protection of the air, water, and other
natural resources and the public trust therein from pollution, impair-
ment, or destruction."3 Since the Act is relatively new, it is difficult
at the present time to describe its scope with complete authority. By
conferring upon each citizen an affirmative right to seek redress
against polluters, however, the statute goes far to alleviate standing
difficulties.32 The statute does retain, though, the balancing of equi-
ties doctrine and, as an affirmative defense, defendants may still plead
that there is no feasible and prudent alternative to their conduct.33
Thus, the courts can continue to weigh the cost of pollution abatement
against the harm done to the environment.
The Michigan statute facilitates private litigation, but even more
far reaching than this are proposals for a constitutional right to a
clean environment. It has been argued alternatively that such a right
presently exists, or, if not, then it should be created by amendment
to the Constitution. One recent case, Environmental Defense Fund
v. Hoerner Waldorf Corp.,34 has indicated that a constitutional right
to a clean environment may be one of the "unenumerated" rights
found in the ninth amendment. 35  Proposals have also been intro-
duced to amend the federal36 and state3 7 constitutions to provide such
30. MIcH. CowP. LAWS. §§ 691.1201-.1207 (Supp. 1971).
31. MicH. CoMP. LAws. § 691.1202(1) (Supp. 1971).
32. Comment, Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970, 4 J. LAwv REFOXIM
121, 123 (1971).
33. MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 691.1202(2) (Supp. 1971). The defendant may of
course also simply deny the facts as stated by the plaintiff.
34. No. 1694 (D. Mont., Aug. 25, 1970).
35. Comment, 32 MONTANA L. REv. 161 (1971). This argument may, perhaps,
find some precedent in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where a so-
called "right of privacy" was constructed out of a penumbra surrounding certain of
the amendments to the Constitution. An individual right to a clean environment
has also been discovered in the Environmental Protection Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-
190, January 1, 1970, 83 Stat. 852. See Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The
Citizen Suit and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 RUTGERS L. Riy.
230 (1970).
36. Representative Ottinger has proposed an amendment to the federal constitu-
tion guaranteeing "to each citizen a wholesome and unimpaired environment."
Ottinger, Legislation and the Environment: Individual Rights and Governmental Ac-
countability, 55 CORNELL L. REy. 667, 672 (1970).
37. In Pennsylvania, the text of H.R. 958 (1969) reads as follows:
[Vol. 1972:291
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a right. These amendments would have a significant impact on the
"balancing of equities" doctrine.38 Although courts have balanced
constitutional rights such as freedom of speech and freedom of the
press against competing interests, 39 they are notoriously reluctant to
admit that constitutional guarantees can be denigrated unless the com-
peting interests are all but overwhelming. 0
Analysis
Despite recent developments which increase the citizen's ability to
utilize private litigation as a means for seeking environmental reform,
the adjudication of this type of dispute continues to pose serious dif-
ficulties for the courts.
Environmental litigation presents questions demanding the evalua-
tion of complex technical and scientific data. It is true that various
types of litigation have involved courts in technological assessment.4 '
Courts have made their own scientific determinations of the effects of
dams on steelhead trout42 and the effect of cedar rust on apple
That article one of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
be amended by adding at the end thereof-, a new section to read:
Section 27 Natural Resources and the Public Estate-The people have a
right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic,
historic, and aesthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's natural re-
sources including the air, waters, fish, wildlife, and the public lands and prop-
erty of the Commonwealth, are the common property of all the people, in-
cluding generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the Common-
wealth shall preserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the people.
See also Roberts, The Right to a Decent Environment, E=MC2: Environment Equals
Man Times Courts Redoubling Their Efforts, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 674, 687 (1970).
38. Constitutional amendments would also seem to reduce standing to sue diffi-
culties for plaintiff's bringing environmental actions. Professor Roberts argues that
such amendments would not be self-executing, but would require enabling legislation,
however. Roberts, The Right to a Decent Environment, E-MC2: Environment
Equals Man Times Courts Redoubling Their Efforts, 55 CORNELL L. Ruv. 674, 688
(1970). This would seem to us hardly self-evident. The first amendment guarantee
of free speech requires no such legislation.
39. For example, Justice Holmes' classic example of a man yelling "fire" in a
crowded theatre. Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
40. See, e.g., Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (Black and Douglas
dissenting).
41. See, e.g., Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961); Jackson
v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 53 N.J. 138, 249 A.2d 65 (1969) (plaintiff sues for hepatitis
contracted as a result of blood transfusion).
42. Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967).
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orchards, 43 but the propriety of such activities is questionable. 4  First,
technical questions put a heavy burden on the courts. It is difficult
for a judge and jury untrained in highly scientific areas such as water
pollution to make competent decisions even when aided by expert
testimony.45 Second, the legal preoccupation with precedent may
encumber technological evaluation. In the past, lawyers and judges
have produced a historical drag on technology and have slowed rec-
ognition of new developments.40
Courts encounter another difficulty in the formulation of appropriate
remedies for pollution cases. The award of money damages is usually
unsatisfactory. Where a water course is polluted by many sources, the
assessment of the physical injury caused by an individual polluter can
be nearly impossible.47 Even where courts can make a fair assessment,
the payment of damages allows the defendant to continue polluting, in
effect granting him an easement over the plaintiff's property.48 For
these reasons, injunctive relief is preferrable.
Injunctive relief can be an extremely quick and effective form of
remedy, and courts have on occasion ordered the immediate cessation
of polluting activities. 49 Nevertheless, the economic effects of imme-
43. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
44. Note, The Role of the Courts in Technology Assessment, 55 CORNELL L.
Ray. 861, 872 (1970).
45. Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony,
15 HAiv. L. REv. 40 (1901).
46. Comment, The Role of the Courts in Technology Assessment, 55 CORNELL
L. REv. 861, 871. A particularly lurid example is noted by the authors. In Gursky v.
Gursky, 34 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963), the court held that a
child conceived by artificial insemination from third party donor semen was illegiti-
mate, even though both husband and wife consented.
47. In Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., 151 Tex. 251, 255, 248
S.W.2d 731, 733 (1952), the court stated: "(T)he courts of the country seem to be
virtually unanimous in refusing to impose joint and several liability on multiple
wrongdoers whose independent tortious acts interfere with a landowner's interest in
the use and enjoyment of land by interfering with his air or water." See Farley v.
Crystal Coal & Coke Co., 85 W. Va. 595, 102 S.E. 265 (1920); RESTATEMeNT Or
TORTS § 881 (1934). But see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Hardee, 189 F.2d 205 (5th
Cir. 1951); Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Laskey, 173 Okla. 48, 46 P.2d 484 (1935).
48. Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co., 161 Cal. 239, 118 P. 928 (1911).
Some have seen defendant as virtually condemning plaintiff's land to his own use.
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 55 Misc. 2d 1023, 287 N.Y.S.2d 112 (Sup. Ct. 1967),
aff'd 30 App. Div. 2d 480, 294 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1968).
49. Western Paper Co. v. Pope, 155 Ind. 394, 57 N.E. 719 (1900); People
ex. rel. Stream Control Commission v. City of Port Huron, 305 Mich. 153, 9 N.W.2d
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1972/iss2/6
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diately closing down large industrial plants are simply too great to
permit permanent injunctions which would force the shutting down of
all operations." Court-appointed masters to oversee the installation
of anti-pollution equipment and to submit periodic progress reports to
the courts have been suggested.51 There is considerable precedent for
the fashioning of complex equitable decrees, even if this engages the
court in a supervisory capacity.5 The Supreme Court has prospected
for oil and gas, drilled wells, and sold petroleum products.53 Other
courts have regulated drive-in movie theater speakers 4 and acted as
terminal control authorities at airports. 55 The Supreme Court has,
however, very recently indicated that it is unwilling to take on the
task of overseeing a major pollution clean-up project, and has implied
that any court will find difficulties in hearing and supervising pollution
problems.56 With the already crowded dockets in most courts, it is
certainly doubtful whether the courts are physically able to supervise
the time consuming difficulties that many pollution cases present.
Also, the grafting of complex administrative machinery on the structure
of the courts by means of masters, continuing decrees, and supervisory
duties would, to a large extent, necessitate restructuring the courts.57
Finally, environmental suits present issues which are more appro-
41 (1943); McCarty v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 189 N.Y. 40, 81 N.E. 549 (1907);
Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1, 101 N.E. 805 (1913).
50. White Lake Improvement Ass'n v. City of Whitehall, 22 Mich. App. 262,
177 N.W.2d 473 (1970); Monroe Carp Pond Co. v. River Raisin Paper Co., 240
Mich. 279, 215 N.W. 325 (1927); Gilpin v. Jacob Ellis Realties, Inc., 47 NJ. Super. 26,
135 A.2d 204 (1957); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 55 Misc. 2d 1023, 287 N.Y.S.
2d 112 (Sup. Ct. 1967), aff'd, 30 App. Div. 2d 480, 294 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1968); York v.
Stallings, 217 Or. 13, 341 P.2d 529 (1959). An example is given in Comment, Cold
Facts on Hot Water: Legal Aspects of Thermal Pollution, 1969 Wisc. L. REv. 253.
A large electric plant in Clearfield County, Pennsylvania, discharged hot water into a
river, raising the temperature to 93 degrees for four miles downstream. However,
closing of the plant would have deprived the county of its only significant source of
income.
51. Renken v. Harvey Aluminum, Inc., 226 F. Supp. 169 (D. Ore. 1963). See also
Comment, Air Pollution, Nuisance Law, and Private Litigation, 1971 UTAH L. R.nv.
142, 147 n.35.
52. Id.
53. Oklahoma v. Texas, 256 U.S. 602 (1921).
54. Payne v. Johnson, 20 Wash. 2d 24, 145 P.2d 552 (1944).
55. Township of Hanover v. Town of Morristown, 108 NJ. Super. 461, 261
A.2d 692 (Ch. 1969).
56. Wyandotte Chem. Corp. v. Ohio, 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
57. Krier, The Pollution Problem and Legal Institutions: A Conceptual Overview,
18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 429, 459 (1970).
Vol. 1972:291]
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priately resolved by political or legislative means than by the courts.
This becomes evident when one considers industrial pollution. Indus-
try uses water as a natural resource just as it uses coal to heat furnaces
or iron ore to make steel. In the past, industry has not been charged
for its use of water.5" The "cost" has been borne by the public at
large in terms of polluted and mutilated lakes and streams. Environ-
mental litigation has attempted to internalize the costs upon industry
through the use of heavy damages or injunctions.50 This cost to in-
dustry will to a great extent be passed along to the consumer. Thus,
by imposing liability on a defendant polluter, the court is making an
environmental quality decision, determining that consumers are willing
to pay higher prices for cleaner waters."0 Such decisions are ordinarily
left to a legislative body, since courts are not equipped with the proper
fact-gathering or opinion-taking tools."'
Courts have decided questions which seem political or legislative in
nature. This is demonstrated by court decisions in the reapportion-
ment 6' 2 and desegregation cases. 3 Courts should be extremely wary,
however, in approaching such questions, and should develop criteria
to decide how effective their decisions will be.64 Conscious decisions
on water quality will have to be made, but they will almost certainly
involve the establishment of priorities of water -use for an entire river
basin.65 Some streams to be used for drinking water and recreational
purposes will require a high level of water purity. Others to be used
58. Water pollution "represents a case where certain costs are imposed on society
at large by the activities of polluters, and because of failures in the market mechanism
those costs remain external to their source-that is, they are not taken into account
by polluters in deciding whether or not their activities are worthwhile to them or
society at large." Krier, The Pollution Problem and Legal Institutions: A Conceptual
Overview, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 429, 444 (1971).
59. Krier, The Pollutiont Problem and Legal Institutions: A Conceptual Overview,
18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 429, 444 (1971).
60. Id. at 458.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 1 (1964).
63. See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
64. Professor Jaffe suggests the following criteria: (1) whether there are well-
developed principles in the area; (2) whether the court's decision would be awkward
because the question is closely related to a complex of decisions beyond the court's
jurisdiction; (3) whether the court's decision would lack effectiveness. Jaffe, Stand-
ing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 H.Iv. L. REv. 1265, 1304 (1961).
65. Hoak, The Thermal Pollution Problem, 33 J. WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
Fm'N (1961).
[Vol. 1972:291
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for industrial and sewage purposes can have a lower level.6" No
precedent is available to guide the courts in making such decisions.
The comprehensiveness needed for water planning militates against the
effectiveness of judicial decision making in private litigation.
II. PUBLIC ACTION AGAINST POLLUTERS
Court action against polluters is by no means limited to private
litigation. State and federal governments have long maintained pollu-
tion control statutes, many dating from the 19th century.67 Some of
these are surprisingly forceful and comprehensive, with a full comple-
ment of enforcement tools-fines, imprisonment, and injunctions.6 8
These statutes, generally, have taken one of two forms: proscriptive
laws imposing an absolute ban on the disposal of pollutants in water-
ways, and prescriptive laws setting minimum standards of water
purity.09 In the past, such measures were largely unenforced and un-
successful. 70 The growth of concern over environmental problems,
however, has brought new attention to such statutes, and has also
brought pleas for vigorous enforcement.7 1
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., an 1892 Wisconsin statute which authorized any city to abate nui-
sances upon river banks, to remove rubbish from which offensive drainage could come,
and to exclude from city waters any waste "inconsistent with or detrimental to the
public health, or calculated to render the water . . . impure or offensive, or tending
in any degree to fill up or obstruct the same." Laws of 1899, Ch. 326 § 52, Wis.
Laws 57.
68. E.F. MuRpny, WATER PUmT: A STUDy iN LEGAL CONTROL OF NAnTxRAL
RESOURCES 59 (1961).
69. Krier, The Pollution Problem and Legal Institutions: A Conceptual Over-
view, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 429, 435 (1971).
70. E.F. MuRPmy, WATER PURrrY: A STUDy IN LEGAL CONTROL OF NATURAL
RESoURcEs 23-28 (1961).
71. See letter to the Attorney-General from Representative Reuss and reply.
Reported in 1 E.R.C.D. 157 (1971). The hopes of many individuals and environ-
mental groups that the Refuse Act could be utilized in a broad clean up campaign is
evidenced by the great number of Qui Tam actions initiated. See, e.g., Durning v.
ITT Rayonier, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 446 (N.D. Wash. 1970); Reuss v. Moss-American,
323 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Bass Angler Sportsman's Soc'y v. U.S. Plywood-
Champion Papers, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 302 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Matthews v. Florida-
Vanderbilt Dev. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. Fla. 1971); United States ex. rel.
Mattson v. Northwest Paper Co., 327 F. Supp. 87 (D. Minn. 1971); Enquist v. Quaker
Oats Co., 327 F. Supp. 347 (D. Neb. 1971); Connecticut Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts
Plating Co., 330 F. Supp. 695 (D. Conn. 1971). Courts have, however, almost in-
variably dismissed these actions on the grounds that Qui Tam actions may not be
maintained under the Refuse Act. See generally, Note, The History and Development
of Qui Tam, 1972 WAsH. U.L.Q. 81.
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The Refuse Act of 189972 is demonstrative of a proscriptive statute.
It lay nearly dormant for over 50 years, but it has recently been re-
vived to serve as the basis for several suits against polluters.7" The
Act outlaws the disposal of "refuse" in navigable waterways or tribu-
taries of any navigable waterway.74 It has been construed to grant the
Attorney General authority to prosecute criminally70 or seek injunctive
relief against polluters. 76  The only pollutants exempted are those
materials running from streets or municipal storm sewers in liquid
form.77  The pollutants need not be waste in the conventional sense.
Substances of considerable economic value such as 100 octane aviation
fuel have been held to be "refuse" within the meaning of the Act.78
The government need not show regular commerce or economic use to
prove navigability necessary to gain federal jurisdiction, 7 but rather
the potential use of the stream for commerce or transportation.80
Furthermore, the Act imposes strict liability, which eliminates the
need to show intent or negligence,81 or actual injury to navigation.,
While criminal prosecution -under the Refuse Act is a potent device,
primary emphasis has been placed upon administrative action and the
utilization of negotiation, rather than litigation, to settle environmental
disputes.8" Enforcement of prohibitive statutes is secondary and lim-
72. The Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411 (1970).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Vulcan Materials, 2 E,R.C. 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
United States v. Transmix, 2 E.R.C. 1075 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States V. Maplewood
Poultry, 320 F. Supp. 1395 (D. Me. 1970); United States v. U.S. Steel, 328 F. Supp. 354
(N.D. Ind. 1971); United States v. Armco Steel, 2 E.R.C. 1067 (D. S.D. 1971);
United States v. St. Regis Paper, 328 F. Supp. 660 (W.D. Wis. 1971).
74. The Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970) provides:
It shall be unlawful to throw, discharge, or deposit . . . any refuse matter
of any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and
sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state, into any navigable water of
the U.S.
75. The Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1970).
76. United States v. Florida Pwr. & Light Co., 311 F. Supp. 1391 (S.D. Fla.
1970). Injunctive relief will lie to restrain the deposit of refuse in navigable waters.
77. See note 74 supra. Solid materials suspended in the runoff from sewers do
not come within the exception. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 363 U.S. 482
(1960).
78. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966).
79. United States v. Cavalliotis, 105 F. Supp. 742 (E.D.N.Y. 1952).
80. Id.
81. The Gansfjord, 25 F.2d 736 (D.C. La. 1928).
82. La Merced, 84 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1936).
83. See President Nixon's Message to Congress, dated February 10, 1970, reported
in 2 E.R.C.D. 203 (1970), outlining a broad seven point proposal for water pollution
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ited to emergencies. The policy has been to refrain from actions under
the Refuse Act unless immediate and irreparable harm to the environ-
ment is threatened or in situations where there has been a gross or
deliberate abuse of the environment such as the accidental discharge
of large amounts of pollutants.8 4
The current program administered by the Environmental Protection
Agency features the establishment of water quality standards and the
issuance of discharge permits. Under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act,85 states are responsible for developing water standards
which define maximum pollution loads for individual watercourses.86
Water quality standards are a prescriptive approach towards pollution
control and form a basis for conferring liability on polluters who con-
tribute to their violation. 7 Under section 9 of the Refuse Act, pollut-
ers are obligated to seek discharge permits from the Army Corps of
Engineers."s Persons applying for such permits are required to pro-
vide detailed information concerning the nature and amount of pollut-
ants they propose to discharge.
Despite efforts to coordinate enforcement of the Refuse Act with
the water quality standards and permit program, some conflicts do
arise, at least from the prospective defendant's point of view. The
Refuse Act is not superceded by other legislation. Compliance with
the latest quality standards does not afford a defense, 89 nor does the
submission of, and application for, a permit under section 9 of the
Refuse Act suspend enforcement of the criminal sections. 0 The pos-
sible confusion of prospective defendants is perhaps understandable;
the calculation of the anti-pollution risk for individual polluters is at
the moment difficult. But, as one court recently pointed out, at a
control. See also Executive Order No. 79834, dated December 23, 1970, reported in
2 CLEAN Asa AND WATER NEWS 53 (1970). The order states that the Refuse Act is to
supplement and be subsidiary to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.
84. See Letter from Assistant Attorney-General to Representative Reuss reported in
2 E.R.C.D. 157 (1971). See also President Nixon's Message to Congress, February
10, 1970, reported in 2 E.R.C.D. 203 (1970), authorizing the Secretary of the Interior
to seek injunctive relief in emergency situations.
85. 33 U.S.C. § 1151 et. seq. (1970).
86. 33 U.S.C. § 1160 (1970).
87. Id.
88. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1970).
89. United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem., 229 F. Supp. 1118 (W.D. Pa.
1971); United States v. Maplewood Poultry, 320 F. Supp. 1395 (D. Me. 1971).
90. Id.
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time when many aspects of the environmental programs are embryonic,
some overlap between statutes and theoretical inconsistency may be of
little consequence.91
A slightly different situation is encountered in several states where
criminal sanctions against polluters are integrated with a general ad-
ministrative program. Here the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is
often applied 9 -judicial relief is postponed until the designated ad-
ministrative remedy has been sought. 3  Minnesota requires a prelim-
inary period of negotiation between the polluter and the State Water
Pollution Commission in which the parties attempt to arrange a mu-
tually agreeable modification in waste disposal before the state can
seek court action. 94 Florida law is similar, and, in a recent case, one
court observed that while water pollution is a frightening problem
"(n) ow is not the time to discard the concepts of due process, fair play
and substitute 'quick justice' in the name of 'kill the pollutants'."'D
This is not to say that Florida is tied to time consuming administrative
proceedings when great environmental damage is threatened. It is
still free to seek injunctive relief, but the modus operandi envisioned
in the usual situation of continuing pollution is administrative."' The
distinction at the federal level is that the Refuse Act is by its terms
not preempted by administrative action. This is accomplished instead
by policy-prosecution discretion.
Analysis
Many of the difficulties incident to private environmental litigation
are alleviated by the enforcement of pollution control statutes. The
standing of litigants to sue is no longer an issue, and the problems
posed by technological assessment and the political nature of environ-
mental disputes are reduced. Anti-pollution statutes, proscriptive or
prescriptive, appraise the standards of wrongful conduct. While courts
may be left with difficult factual determinations, especially with regard
91. United States v. U.S. Steel, 328 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ind. 1971).
92. White Lake Improvement Ass'n v. City of Whitehall, 22 Mich. App. 262,
177 N.W.2d 473 (1970).
93. K. DA VIS, AD M, ST AnvE LA W 664-73 (1951).
94. Reserve Mining v. Minnesota, 2 E.R.C. 1135 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1970). See also
Virginia Water Bd. v. Supervisor, 1 E.R.C. 1482 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1970). But see Diamond
(N.Y.) v. Mobil Oil, 65 Misc. 2d 75, 316 N.Y.S.2d 734 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
95. St. Regis Paper v. Florida, 237 So. 2d 798, 801 (Fla. 1970).
96. Id.
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to prescriptive statutes, they are no longer responsible for the determina-
tion of what constitutes culpable abuse of water purity. The statute,
as an expression of the legislative will, has made the political decision
allocating the economic and social costs of pollution abatement.
There are difficulties, however, inherent in the judicial process
which diminish the court's capacity as a primary arbiter of environ-
mental disputes. Even ambitious programs of enforcing pollution con-
trol statutes have shown little success. 7  A recent Boston study re-
vealed that of some 800 complaints registered by citizens, only four were
prosecuted and still fewer, one, resulted in conviction."8 Comprehensive
enforcement of pollution statutes entails a mammoth policing opera-
tion, multiplication of investigative agencies, and an added burden to
overtaxed prosecutor's offices. While preliminary injunctions have
been granted quickly,"9 criminal suits seeking heavy fines or permanent
injunctions are as costly and time consuming as civil suits. Whatever
the circumstances, violators must be afforded constitutional guarantees
and due process. 00
Lastly, it is doubtful that water pollution is amenable to the essen-
tially ad hoc solution offered by court action. Even the most rudi-
mentary steps in pollution abatement require the interaction of all
levels of government and the private sector. The construction of muni-
cipal treatment plants entails coordination of planning, design, and
finance among local, state, and federal governments.' 0 ' The elimina-
tion of dangerous pesticides from our water resources will only come
with research and development, regulation, and education. Industry,
agriculture and government must all assume roles.' 02  The most
promise lies with regional planning under which entire river basins
may be monitored and the concentration of pollutants controlled
through systems of dams or the temporary cutback in industrial pro-
duction.'03  A successful program must feature a comprehensive out-
97. Kovel, A Case for Civil Penalties: Air Pollution Control, 4 J. URBAN LAW
153 (1968).
98. Id. at 154.
99. United States v. U.S. Steel, 328 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ind. 1971).
100. St. Regis Paper Co. v. Florida, 237 S.2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
101. J. KNEESE, THE ECONOMICS OF REGIONAL WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT 127
(1964).
102. B. COMMONER, THE CLOSING CIRCLE 83 (1971).
103. J. KNEESE, THE ECONOMICS OF REGIONAL WATER QuALITY MANAGEMENT 127
(1964). See also Roberts, River Basin Authorities: A National Solution to Water Pol-
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look, a responsiveness to the situation at hand, and technological
expertise.
IV. PRIVATE SUITS AGAINST AGENCIES
Because of the potential flexibility, efficiency, and comprehensive-
ness of administrative agencies, 04 the creation of a strong administra-
tive body seems the only practical method to deal with the myriad,
complex problems of water pollution. Still, the public has reason to
be apprehensive. In the past, administrative regulatory agencies have
demonstrated certain shortcomings. Too often agencies have turned
into bureaucracies, unresponsive to the public needs and desireslOU
Top administrators of agencies such as the F.C.C. and F.T.C. have
often been chosen from the ranks of the very businesses and industries
which the agency was created to regulate, giving the agency a pro-
nounced bias.'0 6 To give weight to the public voice, a new concept
has developed-the citizen suit. Through suits initiated against gov-
ernmental agencies, citizen "watchdogs" have sought greater control
over planning and policy decisions which may adversely affect the
environment. 07
Two questions have been raised to confront litigants interested in
the judicial review of administrative decisions: standing to sue and the
scope of judicial review. The first case clearly to define standing,
Edward Hines Yellow Pines Trustees v. United States,08 required that
a plaintiff suffer some "legal injury" in order to contest an administra-
tive decision.' 0 9 This narrow requirement hindered a plaintiff who
lution, 83 -R4v. L. RPv. 1527, 1544-56 (1970). Professor Roberts points out the
success of River Basin Authorities in Germany and England.
104. K. DAvis, ADni~nNs'TRAivE LAW Ch. 3 (1951).
105. Professor Joseph L. Saxe of the University of Michigan Law School testified:
"Official agencies which are created to promote and protect the public interest some-
times become too single-minded. In the past few years, a number of cases have
brought home the degree to which important regulatory agencies failed to take into
account all the information and all the perspectives which a proper regard for the
public interest required." Testimony of Joseph L. Saxe before the Committee on
Conservation and Recreation, House of Representatives of Michigan, on H.B. 3055,
January 21, 1970, quoted in Comment, Michigan Environmental Protection Act, 4 J.
OF LAW REFORM 121, 122 (1970).
106. See, e.g., Ottinger, Legislation and the Environment: Individual Rights and
Government Accountability, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 666 (1970).
107. Krier, Environmental Watchdogs: Some Lessons From a "Study" Council, 23
STAN. L. REV. 623 (1971).
108. 263 U.S. 143 (1923).
109. Id. at 148.
[Vol. 1972:291
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1972/iss2/6
WATER POLLUTION
sought to protect the public interest in his suit.'10 Subsequent cases
have extended and broadened standing requirements."' The most
recent test announced by the Supreme Court is that a plaintiff has
standing to challenge an administrative action if "the interest sought
to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of in-
terests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question.""' 2
The implications of this general broadening of standing require-
ments for "environmental watchdogs" is illustrated by the celebrated
case of Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power
Commission."13 The Federal Power Commission licensed Consoli-
dated Edison to build a hydroelectric plant in a scenic area of the
Hudson River Valley. The plaintiff sued the Commission asserting
that it had failed to take into account environmental factors such as
wildlife kills and fish destruction in reaching its decision. The court
found that the F.P.C. was required by statute to take environmental
factors into consideration in reaching a decision. Since the plaintiff
was a group interested in environmental activities, it had standing to
sue the Commission." 4
Even liberalized standing requirements are probably not sufficient,
however, unless the scope of judicial review of administrative action
is broad enough to protect the public interest in pollution control. 115
110. Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of
Administrative Law, 70 COLUm. L. REv. 612, 617-19 (1970).
111. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970) (standing requirement only a shadow of its former self); FCC v. Sanders
Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1948). See also Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial
Review: Private Actions, 75 HARv. L. REv. 255, 272 (1961).
112. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 153 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970). See also Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
113. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
114. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965).
Accord, West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232
(4th Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp.
749 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alaska 1971);
Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401 (D. D.C. 1971); Pennsyl-
vania Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
But see Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, Sierra Club
v. Morton, 401 U.S. 907 (1971). See also Comment, Concern of Conservationist
Group Held Not Sufficient to Confer Standing to Challenge Agency Action, 71 COLUM.
L. REv. 172 (1971).
115. Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Ad-
ministrative Law, 70 CoLUM. L. REv. 612, 619 (1970).
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Traditionally, the scope of judicial review was limited to ascertaining
if the agency action was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law."11  Handicapped by the
narrow scope of review, the courts deferred too often to administrative
expertise, regardless of the adequacy of the agency's investigation of
environmental factors. 11 7  Recent decisions have liberalized the scope
of judicial review."" More importantly, for citizens concerned about
the environmental impact of agency decisions, the National Environ-
mental Protection Act of 1969"10 has provided a new and effective
tool.
Under the provisions of the N.E.P.A., all federal agencies are re-
quired to draw up "environmental impact studies" for every major ad-
ministrative action which may have a significant effect on the quality
of the human environment. 20 Such studies must include adverse
environmental effects of the proposed action; 1 1 possible alternatives; 22
the "relationship between local short-term uses of the environment and
the maintenance of long-term productivity"; 2 3 and "any irreversible
and irretrievable loss of natural resources" by the proposed action.' 24
Courts have granted injunctive relief to halt proposed agency action
where no impact study was undertaken, 25 or where the study was
inadequate. 26
116. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 706 (Supp. IV 1969).
117. Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Ad-
ministrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 612, 615-17 (1970).
118. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). See Scenic Hudson Preservation
Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 620 (2d Cir. 1965) where the court said: "This court
cannot and should not attempt to substitute its judgment for that of the Commission.
But we must decide whether the Commission has correctly discharged its duties, in-
cluding the proper fulfillment of its planning function in deciding that the 'licensing of
the project would be in the overall public interest.' The Commission must see to it
that the record is complete. The Commission has an affirmative duty to inquire into
and consider all relevant facts." See also Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967).
119. National Environmental Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
120. Id. at § 4332(c).
121. Id. at § 4332(c)(ii).
122. Id. at § 4332(c)(iii).
123. Id. at § 4332(c)(iv).
124. Id. at § 4332(c)(v).
125. West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d
232 (4th Cir. 1971).
126. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749
(E.D. Ark. 1971).
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Despite the liberalized provisions of the N.E.P.A., there are still ob-
stacles to successful citizen litigation against agencies. The environmen-
tal watchdog is confronted by the awesome technical staffs, financial re-
sources, and industrial allies of administrative agencies. 12 7  While a
few conservation groups are well-funded, with large legal departments
and adequate technical staffs,' 28 the majority of groups and individ-
uals are more accurately described as Davids pitted against administra-
tive Goliaths. 29 Even when funds are available to procure expert
witnesses, scientists and engineers are reluctant to testify against agen-
cies, which are responsible for letting many research and consultation
contracts. 130 Furthermore, essential evidence may be obtainable only
from the agency, and it can be extremely reluctant to divulge such
information. 3'
Of paramount importance to a citizen who attempts to exercise some
control over agency action is the receipt of proper notice when action
is being contemplated. Yet, our agencies are allowed to carry on their
activities in an almost impenetrable cloud of secrecy. 132  For instance,
under the N.E.P.A., agencies need only publish notice of impending
action in the Federal Register. 33 Few citizen groups composed of
laymen and organized on a local level could be expected to be aware
of, or have access to, the Federal Register.13 4  Unless citizens are
sufficiently informed, timely intervention into agency proceedings is
impossible. The consequences of late action for prospective litigation
127. Like, Multi-Media Confrontation-The Environmentalists' Strategy for a "No
Win" Agency Proceeding, 13 ATOMIC ENERGY L.J. 1, 2 (1971).
128. The Sierra Club is reputed to have 100,000 members, a budget of $3,000,000
and a sixty-man staff. Sierra Club Mounts a New Crusade, BusINEss WEEK, 64-65
(May 23, 1970).
129. Like, Multi Media Confrontation-The Environmentalists' Strategy for a "No
Win" Agency Proceeding, 13 ATOMIC ENERGY L.J. 1 (1971).
130. See Sive, Securing, Examining, and Cross Examining Expert Witnesses in
Environmental Cases, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 1175 (1970).
131. Forkosch, Administrative Conduct in Environmental Areas-A Suggested De-
gree of Public Control, 12 S. TEX. L.J. 1, 13-15 (1970).
132. Id. at 2-3.
133. National Environmental Protection Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1970). N.E.P.A.
requires notice of administrative actions in accordance with Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1967). This law requires publication in the Federal
Register. In addition, some agencies, such as the vast military establishment, are
exempted from publication requirements altogether.
134. Forkosch, Administrative Conduct in Environmental Areas-A Suggested De-
gree of Public Control, 12 S. TEx. L.J. 1, 2-3 (1970).
Washington University Open Scholarship
310 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
against agencies are well illustrated in Nashville 1-40 Steering Com-
mittee v. Ellington."3 5 A citizens group contested the routing of a
proposed highway which would cause severe dislocation to certain
residents of the community. Some nine years of planning and
$10,000,000 had already been invested in the project. Although the
plaintiff's had not received sufficient notice, the court denied relief and
stated that it could only regret that "appellants waited so late to begin
their efforts to correct the grave consequences which will result from
the construction of this highway."'13 6
Agencies have not always welcomed participation by citizens. The
increased demand for involvement by individuals in the decision-
making process has placed a considerable strain on their time, energy,
and ingenuity.' 37  From the agency perspective, citizen-suits further
aggravate the situation. They feel, with some justification, that pro-
tracted litigation can cause major delays of projects that have consid-
erable economic and social consequences." 8" Still, agencies may, in
fact, be responsible for bringing litigation upon themselves. If citizens
were encouraged to participate in the earliest stages of planning,
many of the issues which result in suits could be resolved without
court action. Citizens have been compelled to use courts as a last
resort to control unrestrained agency power.
V. CONCLUSION
The effectiveness of court actions as a means of environmental re-
form varies greatly with the type of litigation. In the context of
private litigation, environmental suits present issues involving technical
assessments which are not readily justiciable. More importantly,
courts are often urged to make decisions which transcend their tradi-
tional role. Environmental reform entails changes as basic as the
modification of industrial production and the reallocation of economic
burdens among various segments of society. The sponsorship and
supervision of such an undertaking is more properly a legislative
rather than judicial function. The enforcement of anti-pollution stat-
utes by public officials removes some of the difficulties encountered
135. 387 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1967).
136. Id. at 186.
137. Miller, Ecology and the Administrative Process, 23 AD. L. REv. 59, 63 (1970).
138. Hanes, Citizen Participation and Its Impact Upon Prompt and Responsible
Administrative Action, 24 S.W.LJ. 731, 738 (1970).
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in private litigation; however, water pollution is a complex affair. The
analysis and resolution of problems which involve entire river basins
and water way areas require a flexibility and comprehensiveness which
courts are ill-suited to provide. Administrative agencies are a more
appropriate institution.
Yet, the courts do have an important role in remedying pollution of
our water, not as the primary organ through which reform is sought,
but as the instrument with which citizens may oversee the operation.
Experience has shown that if administrative agencies are to be respon-
sive to the public, citizens must have a measure of control. Attendance
at public hearings, registration of complaints, and publicity may
significantly influence agency decisions, but these efforts can prove
meaningless unless the courts are available as an ultimate check on
the agencies. Lessened standing requirements and increased scope of
review have promoted the effectiveness of citizen-suits, but notice prob-
lems and lack of resources combine to undermine the effectiveness of
citizen watchdogs. Yet, it does not seem impossible to integrate the
concept of a comprehensive administrative approach to water pollution
control with the court's role as an effective tool for the citizen to
utilize.
If citizens are to provide a countervailing force to possible abuse of
power by agencies, several measures are necessary. Citizen action is
dependent upon public awareness, and it is most effective when exer-
cised at the earliest possible point in agency proceedings. For this
reason, new notice requirements should be imposed upon agencies.
Such requirements could include publishing proposals for major agency
action in trade papers, dailies, announcements to groups and organi-
zations, and public posters. 13 9 These requirements could be enforced
through the judicial power to entertain suits for injunctions and dam-
ages for non-compliance.140  Further steps to inform the public might
include hearings held in the neighborhood of proposed power plants,
dams, sewage treatment plants, etc. These could be conducted on
weekends or in the evenings to allow maximum citizen participation. 141
At the present time, government agencies enjoy an overwhelming
advantage over citizen watchdogs in terms of financial resources and
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Miller, Ecology and the Administrative Process, 23 AD. L. REv. 59, 64 n.15
(1970).
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expertise. This disparity must be overcome. Several suggestions have
been forwarded to meet the needs of citizens. A Canadian author has
proposed the creation of public action funds available to public interest
groups who seek to initiate effective environmental litigation.' 42  Still
other authors suggest setting up environmental ombudsmen to aid
and advise citizens seeking to represent the broad public interest. 1 3
Another possibility is to provide free counsel for an indigent plaintiff
seeking review of an agency decision, much in the same manner as
that already provided to defendants in criminal trials.14' Clearly, no
one suggestion may solve the entire problem. But, all of the sug-
gestions lead toward the same goal: a strong administrative approach
to the comprehensive conservation of our water resources balanced
against an intelligent and effective citizenry who may look to the
courts to safeguard against the abuse of power.
142. Lucas, Legal Techniques for Pollution Control: The Role of the Public, 6 U.
oF Burr. COL. L. REv. 167, 189 (1971).
143. Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Ad-
ministrative Law, 70 CoLUM. L. R1v. 612, 650 (1970).
144. Like, Multi-Media Confrontation-The Environmentalists' Strategy for a "No
Win" Agency Proceeding, 13 ATomIc ENERGY L.. 1, 24 (1971).
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